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ences of their constituents. The residuals from the equation, which no longer correlate with constituency demographic characteristics, are then presumed to measure the effect of legislators' personal ideologies on roll call voting.2
Two problems with this now-standard methodology seem particularly vexing: the correlation fallacy and the cross-section problem. The correlation fallacy arises because, as Achen (1978) noted, a correlation between constituency characteristics (including public opinion) and roll call votes does not measure representation. Very simply, politicians' positions on an issue may be very different from that desired by their constituents even if the variation in the politicians' positions correlates highly with the variation in the constituents' characteristics.
If one is interested in representation, one needs to measure the difference or distance between the positions taken on issues by the representative and those that constituents would wish their representative to take.
The cross-sectional problem is closely related. A cross-sectional study of roll call voting using the standard methodology explains the dispersion of support for a proposal around the mean but leaves unexamined how this support changes if the proposal changes (VanDoren 1990) . For example, examination of a single confirmation vote cannot tell us the extent to which the judicial ideology and perceived qualifications of a nominee affect the votes of senators because those characteristics do not vary in the single cross-section. Yet if we are interested in whether a senator is trying to represent the wishes of a constituency with preferences about the judicial ideology and qualifications of nominees, we need to consider how the senator's behavior changes as those characteristics change. In short, one needs to measure in the same substantive policy space the difference between actual proposals, the "ideal" proposals preferred by constituents, and those chosen by the senator. In sum, this set of problems with the standard methodology suggests the need for roll call analysis employing spatial models of behavior.
A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting
Spatial models of roll call behavior, those that map several bills simultaneously in some policy space such as money or ideology, allow us to answer many questions that otherwise could not be resolved. For instance, if we examined several health bills simultaneously and included the cost of the bills as independent variables, we might determine the relationship between the cost of the bill and the probability of legislators' voting yes. Further, since distances between the bill and the ideal points of legislators could in principle readily be deter2The residuals may measure the eftect of personal ideology, but they do not measure personal ideology itself. If Joe Biden is slightly more conservative than we would expect a Delaware Democrat to be, this only means that Biden is relatively more conservative than his constituents are. This does not mean that he is personally conservative. mined, the influence of various political actors could easily be assessed. For example, do presidential initiatives pass because the president influences Congress, or do they win only when the bill is close to the median member? Do presidents who face opposition-controlled chambers do worse because the average senator is further away, or might there be institutional factors that lessen the president's influence under such circumstances? Does lobbying influence legislators, or are lobbyists merely preaching to the converted?
The use of such models of roll call voting is just beginning. Krehbiel and Rivers (1988) applied a spatial model of roll call voting to examine the relative effect of committee power on congressional outcomes. Their study requires deriving the ideal points of senators. With one roll call vote, one could determine whether that ideal point is above or below the proposed value. By examining two amendments, the authors were able to place members' preferences for the 1980 minimum wage within three ranges (less than $2.975, between $2.975 and $3.10, and greater than $3.10). Using an ordered probit analysis, precise ideal points were then estimated using constituent characteristics as independent variables. In this section we propose an alternative but complementary spatial model of roll call voting.
A Simple Random Utility Model of Roll Call Voting
We draw on models in the spatial theory of elections (esp. Enelow and Hinich 1982; 1984, secs. 5.1-2) and models of qualitative choice in economics (Train 1986 ), marketing (Louviere 1988 , and psychology (Krantz and Tversky 1971) . We develop the model in the context of confirmation voting, but extending it to roll call voting in general is straightforward. For purposes of exposition, we assume sincere voting or rationally nonstrategic voting (Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985) throughout. We modify the basic model to distinguish between personal and constituency preferences shortly.
Assume senator i votes for nominee j iff
Uii Iaii where uij is a reservation utility level that may vary across senators and nominations; Uij is assumed to be a function of the characteristics of the nominee (including contextual features of the nomination such as presidential control of the Senate) and of the senator. Let Nij denote the vector of all relevant characteristics of the nominee for senator i and Sij denote the vector of all relevant characteristics of the senator at the time of nominee j. Partition the elements of Nij into two subvectors: the first, labeled ni, composed of those characteristics of IOO Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover servable characteristics. We may decompose Uij into two subfunctions: o function of observable variables and one a function of unobservable ones, to wit, U,j(Nij, S,j) = V,j(nij, s,j, /3) + e,1 where ,3 is a vector of parameters. Assume that senator i's reservation utility has three components: a,, a value constant across all nominees for senator i but possibly differing across senators; aj, a component specific to nominee j but common to all senators; and, V, a value common to all senators over all nominees. Then (via substitution) senator i votes for nominee j iff V1j(nij, Sjj /3) + e,j a ai + aj + V or V,j(nij, s,j, /3) -V a-a -aj e,1 (1) Given a specific functional form for Vij random variable eij, we may estimate the from senator i. We assume below that V,j( and that each eij is distributed independen extreme value (Weibull) distribution. Accordingly, the model may be estimated as a logit model. The assumptions about the alphas suggest the dummy variables technique for pooled time series of cross-sections.
The spatial character of the model comes from the specific implementation of sij. Consider a closed, bounded, and connected subset of the real line normalized to [0, 1] . (We ignore higher dimensional spaces for expositional clarity.)
where d(i) is a distance metric, assumed henceforth to be squared Euclidean distance. We assume V1j( ) is unimodal in sij with
A SPATIAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING IOI policy reputations to infer candidate positions on issues (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984, chap. 4) . Then electorally minded senators have an incentive to maintain the "right" policy reputation (Dougan and Munger 1989 In principle, adding personal policy preferences to the model is straightforward. Let y, be senator i's optimal location in nominee characteristics space for preserving his or her ideological reputation. Assume, however, that the senator has direct personal preferences in this space, with those preferences unimodal at ideal point ye. Define sj, and sP,, as in equation (2) but using y, and pie, respec- Suppose one does not have a measure of the senator's personal ideology but only a measure of the tendency to shirk in one direction or the other (i.e., the information given by an ideology residual). One cannot proceed as straightforwardly, but nonetheless one can detect the effect of shirking in a specific roll call vote. Consider the six cases portrayed in Figure 1 (for simplicity, subscripts are dropped in the figure) . In case 1, y, lies to the right of y, on the 0-1 scale, and the ideology residual indicates py must lie to the left of y . In case 1 a, sp is less than s', so if the senator shirks (places positive weight on s'), he or she will be more likely to vote for the nominee than if he or she had focused exclusively on maintaining policy reputation. If, however, yp, lies far beyond yj (as shown in case lb) then sp may be larger than s' and shirking may actually decrease the probability of voting for the nominee. Unfortunately cases la and lb are indistinguishable using an ideology residual; therefore, one cannot offer a definite hypothesis about the effect of the residual in case 1. However, it seems likely the residual will increase the probability of a yes vote. Case 2 is similar to case 1, with y, and yp falling to the left of yj. Again, no definite hypothesis is possible, although a positive effect seems likely. Case 3, however, is very different. In both cases 3a and 3b, yi and yp fall on the same side of N, and yp farther from y, than y,. Accordingly, sp must be larger than sc. Consequently, shirking must lower the probability of voting for the nominee (given the earlier assumption of unimodal utility functions). This is an unequivocal, testable hypothesis about shirking in the spatial framework.
Measuring Constituent and Personal Ideology
Our concern here is to develop a measure of state-level ideology so that ADA scores can be partitioned into that part attributable to constituent preferences and that part presumably based on the personal preferences of senators.
The measure we develop must be usable at least as far back as the 1955 Harlan nomination.
As indicated previously, the most common method involves regressing ADA scores on a variety of demographic characteristics and using the predicted scores as a measure of state-level ideology. Such predictions will be purged of personal ideology, but such regressions are very sensitive to which of the innumerable indirect surrogates of ideology are used. Our theories of political culture are probably not strong enough to help us decide which variables to include and which to exclude. In addition, such models can easily fall victim to the individualistic fallacy. The fact that blacks may be more liberal than whites on average in no way means that states with large black populations will be more liberal on average than states with small black populations. States such as Mississippi are a prime example of this.
A second approach is to use state-level social survey data. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data to allow us to start aggregating in the smaller states prior to the mid-1970s (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985) .
A third alternative, the one we choose, is to use selected presidential elec- The elections that fit the criteria then are 1964, 1972, and 1984 . These choices are consistent with the results of Macdonald and Rabinowitz (1987) , who find these to be three of the four most ideological presidential elections since 1920.7
Knowing the average ideological proclivity of voters in a state will not necessarily give us the average ideological proclivity of a senator's constituents in a state. As Fiorina (1974 ), Fenno (1978 , Peltzman (1984) , and others have demonstrated, Democrats and Republicans in Congress represent different constituencies. Interesting support for this "two constituencies" hypothesis comes from Shapiro et al. (1990) 'Explanations for this apparently non-Downsian behavior include concern over primaries and mobilizing party activists. Such behavior is also consistent with the directional theory of voting (see Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989 To this end we regressed each senator's actual ADA score in the year of a confirmation vote on state-level presidential election results from our key ideological elections (1964, 1972, and 1984) (Massaro 1990 ). Finally, we include the president's popularity, which has been extensively linked to executive success in the legislative arena (Edwards 1980 (Edwards , 1989 Kernell 1986; Mouw and MacKuen 1989; Neustadt 1960; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985; Rohde and Simon 1985) . Next, we account for the fact that organized interest groups, representing, as they do, more active citizens and potential campaign contributions, might also be able to influence senators. Certainly, there is historical evidence that lobbying campaigns have influenced the confirmation process. For example, Fish (1989) argues that the rejection of Judge Parker in 1930 was due in large part to the activity of organized labor and the NAACP in mobilizing opposition to the nomination. The nomination of Haynsworth brought forth a torrent of interest group activity, which in turn was exceeded by the almost frenetic mobilization of groups during the Bork nomination.
Despite the importance of group activity in these and possibly other nominations, almost no systematic empirical work has been undertaken on the role of interest groups in nominations to the Supreme Court (but see Caldeira and Wright 1989) . In fact, while numerous scholars have, with mixed results, examined the motivation and consequences of campaign contributions by organized groups (Austin-Smith 1987; Baron 1989; Chappell 1982; Denzau and Munger 1986; Jacobson 1987; Welch 1974; J. Wright 1985) , very few studies systematically gauge the effect of lobbying on legislators' votes or governmental decisions (see Schlozman and Tierney 1986, chap. 12; J. Wright 1990) . Surprisingly, there is more systematic evidence of the influence of organized interests on the judicial process (Caldeira and Wright 1988; O'Connor and Epstein 1983; Puro 1971 ).
Data and Variables

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable consists of the 1,475 confirmation votes cast by senators from the nomination of John Harlan through the nomination of Anthony Kennedy. We exclude nominees approved by voice votes on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, senators convey no information about their ideological brand name to constituents when nominees are approved by voice votes.
The only information conveyed is that less than a "sufficient second," one-fifth Qualifications ranges from zero (most unqualified) to one (most qualified). Ideology ranges from zero (extremely conservative) to one (extremely liberal).
As indicated elsewhere (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990) , the data are reliable and appear to be valid. The ideology scores meet the strictest test for validity, predictive validity. The ideology scores correlate at .80 with the ideological direction of the votes the approved nominees later cast on the court (Segal and Cover 1989) .
Constituent Ideology
As already noted, we measure constituent ideology as the predictions from regressing ADA scores on presidential election voting and partisanship.
Constituent Distance
Constituent distance is the squared distance between nominee ideology and constituent ideology. The scaling procedure employed is discussed in Appendix A.
Personal Ideology
We measure each senator's personal "ideology" as the difference between his or her actual and predicted ADA scores. As discussed above, we make two predictions about the effect of the residuals. We expect cases 1 and 2 ("Shirk + ")
to be positive and case 3 ("Shirk -") to be negative.
Presidential Strength and Same Party Status
We measured presidential strength as a dummy variable that takes the value one when the president's party controls the Senate and the president is not in the fourth year of his term and zero otherwise. We measured same party as a dummy variable that takes the value one when a senator is of the same party as the president and zero otherwise.
Presidential Popularity
We measure the president's popularity as the percentage of people who approve of the job the incumbent is doing as president as measured by the Gallup survey prior to the Senate vote.
Interest Group Activity
In the best of all possible situations, we would have senator-level data on the amount of lobbying by organized interests dating back to 1954. Obviously, such data are unavailable. Thus, while recognizing that some senators will be lobbied more than others, we choose a variable that measures lobbying activity with respect to each nominee, the number of organized interests presenting testimony for (interest group pro) and against the nominee (interest group con) at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. Presumably, the more organized op-A SPATIAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING lO9 position to a nominee, the less support he or she will have, and alternatively, the more organized support for a nominee, the more support he or she will have.
We have gathered data on nominee ideology and qualifications, presidential strength and popularity, interest group activity, and senators' personal and constituent ideologies for the 16 nominations from John Harlan to Anthony Kennedy in order to study the 1,475 confirmation votes cast by senators in those nominations. We supply additional information on the nominees in Table 1 . The variables are summarized in Table 2 .
Results
We estimated the model using logit analysis. The results are presented in Table 3 .A. (The essentially similar estimates for the model with voice votes included is presented in Table 3 .B.) As can be seen, the results for the model are quite impressive. All of the estimated logit coefficients were of the predicted sign, were of reasonable magnitudes, and were highly significant. Ninety-two percent of the votes were predicted correctly, for a 62% reduction in error.
Though logit does not have a commonly accepted R2, the estimated R2 running the model with the McKelvey-Zavoina probit program is .78." Judged by an array of statistical criteria, the model was very successful.
As the results indicate, confirmation voting is decisively affected by the ideological distance between senators' constituents and nominees. A one standard deviation increase in that distance decreases the probability of a yes vote by .32. Qualifications by itself has only a moderate effect on voting. A one standard deviation change in this variable, which accounts for a full quarter of the scale, "The correlation between the probit and logit estimates is greater than .99.
IIO Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover Note: Impact measures the change in probability of a yes vote given a one standard deviation change in the independent variable for an undecided (p = .5) senator.
All coefficients are significant at p < .001 except interest group + (p < .05).
effects the probability of a yes vote by .17. This is not to say though that qualifications matters only moderately, for that is not correct. Qualifications has an additional effect on voting when it interacts with ideological distance. Here, a one standard deviation change lowers the probability of a yes vote by . 19. Thus, senators will overwhelmingly vote for close nominees who are well qualified, and for the most part, they will also vote for close nominees who are not so well qualified. Senators are moderately likely to vote against highly qualified distant nominees; they are almost certain not to vote for distant nominees who are not highly qualified.
Because we do not have direct measures of the personal ideology of senators, we cannot make claims about the effect of the ideological distance between the personal ideology of senators and the ideology of nominees. Further, we cannot be completely certain that the residuals do not partially represent some unmeasured constituency-based interests. Nevertheless, the results do suggest that even when measured indirectly, the personal ideology of senators does have A SPATIAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING III the change in probability of a yes vote given a one standard deviation change in the independent variable for an undecided (p = .5) senator.
All coefficients significant at p < .001 except interest group + (p = .01). a significant impact on confirmation voting. When both the senator and the nominee are either to the right or the left of the senator's constituents, the senator is more likely to vote for the nominee. Alternatively, when the senator is on the opposite side of his or her constituents from the nominee, the senator is less likely to vote for the nominee.
We next examine presidential influence on the votes of senators. First, presidents clearly are more successful when they are in a strong legislative position (i.e., when their party controls the Senate and they are not in an election year).
This is especially the case for senators who remain undecided after examining the characteristics of the nominee. According to the model, a switch from a weak to a strong president raises to .79 the probability of a yes vote from a senator who was previously undecided. A lesser effect is felt for being a member of the president's party. Same party status raises the probability of a yes vote from .5
to .64.
The final presidential variable that we examine is the president's approval rating. Unquestionably, there is no one-to-one relationship between presidential popularity and confirmation approvals. President Nixon, for instance, was at the height of his popularity when Haynsworth and Carswell were rejected (65% and 63% approval, respectively). President Johnson's approval rating was only at 39% when Thurgood Marshall was confirmed. Yet it is also true that Johnson's approval ratings were almost as low when Fortas was rejected as chief justice (42%), and President Reagan was near his second-term low when Bork was defeated (50%). On average, the difference between an unpopular president (e.g., 40% approval) and a popular one (e.g., 60% approval) is the difference for an undecided senator between a .50 probability of voting yes and a .77 probability of voting yes.
Finally, strong interest group mobilization against a nominee can hurt a candidate, while interest group mobilization for a nominee can have substantively slight but statistically significant positive effects. The Bork nomination provides an interesting example. Seventeen organized groups provided testimony against Bork at the Judiciary Committee hearings; 20 provided testimony for him. The net effect was to lower the log of the odds ratio of a yes vote by 3.11.
In probabilistic terms, a moderate-to-conservative southern senator who might have voted for Bork with a probability of .99 without any interest group pressure would have a probability of voting for him of .60 after the intensive interest group mobilization.
Interest groups appear to have had an even more devastating effect on the Haynsworth nomination. Sixteen groups presented testimony against Haynsworth; only three presented testimony for him. The net effect was to lower the log of the odds ratio of a yes vote by 3.85. Senators who would have had a .99 probability of voting for the judge without any interest group involvement would lean against confirmation (p = .43) after the lobbying campaign. Though many conservatives blamed the Reagan White House for failing to mobilize support for Bork, it would seem the Nixon White House was far more "culpable" in its failure to organize support for Haynsworth.
Beyond the parameter estimates, the model does an admirable job in predicting confirmation outcomes. Table 4 a straightforward task. The vote on the Fortas nomination as chief justice was 45 yea and 43 nay, but this majority was insufficient to invoke cloture, and thus the nomination was defeated. Under current rules, 41 no votes guarantees that cloture cannot be invoked. In fact, no nominee through 1988 has been confirmed with more than the 33 negative votes received by Rehnquist in 1986. If we use contemporary cloture standards as our decision rule for passage, then we correctly predict the outcome of every nomination.
We further tested our statistical model for the possibility of violated assumptions. The final result is that our substantive conclusions do not change.
Details are reported in Appendix B.
Discussion and Conclusion
By conducting our analysis within an explicit spatial framework, we directly address the effects of nominee characteristics on senators' voting decisions. We find that the votes of senators are highly dependent on the ideological distance between a senator's constituents and the nominee, on the perceived qualifications of the nominee, and on the interaction between the two. In short, the reception of a nominee depends in a fairly subtle way on the characteristics of the nominee and the detailed composition of the Senate.
The spatial framework also allows us to address questions of representation more directly than similar studies of roll call voting. As noted earlier, inferences about representation are clouded by the use of a residual to measure personal ideology. In addition, we view representation as more complex than simple policy congruence. Instead, senators may try to maintain optimal policy reputations across a range of issues. We suggest this behavior is compatible with a strong form of representation. Starting with this view of representation, we find that the individual policy preferences of senators in fact have a measurable impact on their votes for Supreme Court nominees. This finding indicates some degree of nonrepresentational behavior, even under a looser concept of representation.
Finally, we find that the context of a nomination strongly influences roll call votes. The strength and popularity of the president emerge as important determinants of individual votes. In addition, the relative mobilization of interest groups around a nominee can have a profound effect on voting.
We close by noting that no analysis, including our own, has done a fully satisfactory job of incorporating the disparate factors involved in roll call voting. One could extend this basic framework to develop a theory of measurement error in this setting (e.g., elements of X map with error into ADA score and elements of Y map with error into nominee ideology score). Given the statistical results on errors-in-variables reported below, we do not pursue this point any further.
Estimating a Conversion Function
We now outline a procedure for estimating the conversion function 5, given a general functional form. It is easy to show that a wide range of mappings from nominee ideology space to brand name space implies a conversion function k -' of the general form g(y,) = 6,h(x,) -6o. As discussed in the body of this paper, assume a random utility model of voting and a utility function with the specific functional form presented there. Further assume a squared Euclidean distance as a distance metric. Then one may search for the values of 65 and 6, that minimize -2*log likelihood ratio in the logistic regression model; this procedure is somewhat analogous to the Hildreth-Lu procedure for autocorrelation. Using this method, we derive the conversion function v, = .2 + .5x,. (Note that this function is continuous and one-to-one [though not onto] as required above.) However, a striking 2The exposition of the random utility model assumed a comparison between the utility of a nominee and a threshold utility, while the discussion here assumes a comparison between two nominees, j and k. But from the intermediate value theorem and given the assumptions above, for any attainable utility level, there is a corresponding xi. Hence, a politician voting for j if the utility of doing so exceeds a threshold can be treated as if he or she were comparing j with some nominee k who yields the threshold level of utility.
iI6 Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover feature of the data set is the robustness of the qualitative results to a wide range of conversion parameters. For example, the simplest conversion (8o = 0, 6, = I) fits the data virtually as wel the best conversion and yields fairly similar estimates for the logit parameters.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we examine our statistical model for any possibilities of violated assumptions.
Specifically, we consider the consequences of measurement error and correlated error structures.
Measurement Error
In deriving our spatial model, we paid careful attention to placing nominee ideology and senators' preferences in the same policy space. Yet this procedure does not guarantee that either nominee ideology or senators' preferences are measured without error. The result is that our ideological distance measure has two potential sources of error. If this error is significant, our parameter estimates could be biased.
While we accept that some degree of measurement error exists in our data, we do not believe the amount of error or the resulting bias to be serious. To test this proposition, we conducted reverse regressions (Klepper and Leamer 1984; Leamer 1984) in which distance and the qualificationsdistance interaction become the left-hand-side variables, and vote is placed on the right-hand-side of the equation. In neither instance do we find the systematic effects of measurement error that are found, for example, in employment discrimination analyses (Maddala 1988) .
Correlated Error Structures
Because of the pooled cross-sectional time series design of the study, there are three distinct ways in which errors can be correlated with one another: over time, over space, and over both time and space (Stimson 1985) . Correlations over time would be most likely to exist if the error of a particular senator at time t correlated with the error of that senator at any time beyond t. Correlations over space would be most likely to occur if the errors of one or more senators on a particular vote correlate with the errors of other senators on that same vote. For instance, our residual analysis suggests that we consistently overpredicted the probability of voting in favor of Potter Stewart (see Table 4 ). Correlations over time and space would occur if the true slope coefficients vary from one nomination to another.
To control for the possibility of correlated errors in time and space, we employed a logit variant of the least squares dummy variable technique (Sayrs 1989) . First, to control for correlations across time, we added a dummy variable for the 234 senators who voted in more than one confirmation.
The results suggest that autocorrelated errors are not a problem; the senator dummies taken as a Note: Impact measures the change in probability of a yes vote given a one standard deviation change in the independent variable for an undecided (p = .5) senator.
All substantive coefficients significant at p < .001 except popularity (not significant) and interest group + (p = .05). Stewart and Bork significant at p < .01 Harlan, at p = .05.
pretations of the coefficients. With the exception of presidential popularity, significance levels rem extremely high, and the impact of the variables, though changed somewhat, are relatively the same.
One significant difference is the greater effect of positive interest group mobilization, but that pales in comparison to negative interest group mobilization. 14 If the slope coefficients for the independent variables vary for each nomination, then the mod will produce correlated errors in time and space. The usual method of estimating the extent of such problems is to run separate logit analyses for each nomination and then use a x2 test to determine whether restricting the coefficients to the same value across nominations (i.e., pooling) results in a significant reduction in overall fit (Sayrs 1989) . Unfortunately, the nature of our data makes such a "Presidential popularity remains significant when voice votes are included in the model. 'I4f we add dummy variables for all nominees whose no votes are mispredicted by two votes or more, multicollinearity starts to become an extreme problem. For instance, the correlation between strong president and the remaining variables in the model increases to .9, and its standard error jumps from .6 to 2.5. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates remain basically the same.
I I 8 Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover test impossible. First, several of the nominations were unanimous, and thus there is no variance to explain within those cross-sections. We could exclude these cross-sections from our pool but to do so leaves unexplained why those nominees received such high levels of support relative to other nominees (presumably because they are ideologically moderate or highly qualified) and simultaneously creates a serious selection bias problem. Second, our model necessarily makes use of nomineelevel independent variables such as the qualifications of the nominee. These variables could not be used to predict votes in individual nominations, as the scores only vary across nominations. Because of these problems, we then attempted a simpler test to determine whether the slope for ideological distance varies across nominations by including interaction terms between each of the N -I nominees and ideological distance. Unfortunately, the logit results did not converge. We were able to test whether the slope for ideological distance differed from the first eight nominations to the next eight by adding a dummy variable for the first set and an interaction between the dummy variable and ideological distance. Neither estimate was even close to being significant. The results though are only a necessary condition for assuming constant slopes, not a sufficient condition.
We are left without an explicit test of whether the nominations should be pooled. We note though that the case for pooling is at least reasonable given the overall fit of the model. It is difficult to imagine that we could predict 93% of the votes correctly and obtain a mean absolute error of 2.1 votes per nomination if the slope coefficients across nominations are randomly distributed. '"
